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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that there existed a specifically French tradition of conceptualizing civil 
society, developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which differed in important 
respects from the Anglo-American emphasis on the market sphere. It shows that this tradition, 
which had its roots in Montesquieu’s Esprit des lois, and was exemplified most famously in 
the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, argued for the existence of a third, intermediary sphere 
between the government and the people as indispensable for the preservation of political lib-
erty. At the same time, this paper shows how the French thinkers here discussed feared that 
the preservation of this intermediate sphere of civil society was threatened by the rise of mod-
ern, individualistic society. French defenders of civil society were therefore highly critical of 
modernity – a critical attitude which seems to have been inherited by some of their contempo-
rary descendants, such as Robert Putnam.   
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
In diesem Papier wird die These vertreten, dass sich im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert eine besonde-
re französische Tradition der Begriffsbildung von „Zivilgesellschaft“ entwickelte, die sich in 
wichtigen Bereichen von der angloamerikanischen Betonung der Sphäre des Marktes unter-
schied. Es zeigt, dass in dieser Tradition, wurzelnd in Montesquieus Esprit des lois und in den 
bekannten Schriften von Alexis de Tocqueville, die Existenz einer dritten, intermediären 
Sphäre zwischen Regierung und Volk postuliert wurde, welche als unverzichtbar für die Be-
wahrung politischer Freiheit angesehen wurde. Zugleich zeigt das Papier, dass die hier unter-
suchten französischen Denker befürchteten, die Entwicklung der modernen individualisti-
schen Gesellschaft bedrohe die Wahrung dieser intermediären Sphäre der Zivilgesellschaft. 
Die französischen Verteidiger der Zivilgesellschaft waren daher gegenüber der Moderne äu-
ßerst kritisch eingestellt – eine Haltung, die auf ihre geistigen Nachkommen in der Gegenwart 
wie beispielsweise Robert Putnam abgefärbt zu haben scheint. 
 
 
In 1991, the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor published an important article in which he 
reflected on the intellectual history of theories of civil society. Taylor distinguishes in this 
article between two different conceptualizations of civil society as they had developed in 
modern political thought. One, which he describes as the “L-stream” in thinking about civil 
society, identifies it primarily with the market sphere. Exemplified by the writings of English 
political theorist John Locke, this intellectual tradition imagined civil society as the whole of 
inter-related acts of production, exchange and consumption, with their own internal dynamic 
and their own autonomous laws. Civil society in this sense became a key concept in Anglo-
American liberalism, as a private sphere which needs to be protected as much as possible 
from state interference. The other tradition in modern political thought, however, developed 
by French thinkers such as Charles-Louis de Montesquieu and Alexis de Tocqueville, had a 
very different outlook on civil society. In the “M-stream”, as Taylor calls it, civil society is 
seen not as the market sphere, but rather as a collection of voluntary groups and associations 
existing more or less independently from the state. Civil society in this second sense of the 
word is not perceived as the opposite of the state. It exists as an equilibrium between central 
government and other loci of power and influence.1
Taylor’s distinction is illuminating in many ways. It suggests, for instance, that contem-
porary defenders of civil society in the second, “political” sense of the word, such as Andrew 
Arato, Jean Cohen and Robert Putnam, are indebted to a specifically French political tradition 
– a lineage that is not always explicitly acknowledged in the existing literature.2 In this paper, 
I aim to elucidate on Taylor’s arguments in two different ways. First, I will flesh out Taylor’s 
notion that there existed a specifically French tradition of conceptualizing civil society, devel-
oped in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which differed in important respects from the 
Anglo-American emphasis on the market sphere.3 Second, I will argue that this tradition had 
one particular characteristic which is not discussed by Taylor: namely, its historical pessi-
mism. I will show that the French tradition in the history of civil society, which found its most 
famous expression in Tocqueville’s work, was to a certain extent a back-ward-looking ideol-
ogy, which was highly critical of democratic modernity.  
 
*** 
 
                                                 
1 Charles Taylor, “Civil society in the Western tradition”, in The notion of tolerance and human rights. Essays in 
honour of Raymond Klibansky, Ethel Groffier and Raymond Klibansky, eds. (Ontario, 1991). 
2 John Keane likewise emphasizes the importance of the contribution of French political thinkers such as Alexis 
de Tocqueville to the formulation of a specifically ‘political’ conception of civil society, cf. his seminal 
“Despotism and Democracy. The origins and development of the distinction between civil society and the state 
1750-1850” in Civil society and the state. New European perspectives, John Keane ed. (London, 1988). But 
compare: Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani, “Introduction: ideas of civil society”, in Civil society. History and 
possibilities, Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani eds. (Cambridge, 2001).  
3 The existence of such a language of civil society against the strong state is also discussed by Pierre Rosanval-
lon in his iconoclastic book Le modèle politique français. La société civile contre le jacobinisme de 1789 à nos 
jours (Paris, 2004). Rosanvallon clearly shows that the Jacobin legacy of the strong state was widely contested in 
post-revolutionary France, although he seems to be unaware of the ideological roots of this discourse in Montes-
quieu’s Esprit des lois.  
Taylor traces the “M-stream” in the theory of civil society, as mentioned above, back to Mon-
tesquieu.4 At first sight, this lineage might seem inappropriate, since Montesquieu did not 
give the word civil society special prominence in his major treatise, the Esprit des lois (1748). 
However, Montesquieu introduced an important new idea into modern political thought by 
arguing for the importance of “intermediary powers” in a state.5 In the Esprit des lois, he drew 
a fundamental distinction between monarchy, “the rule of one according to the law”, and des-
potism, “the rule of one according to his own caprice”. Traditional, Aristotelian political the-
ory maintained that tyranny or despotism was merely a corruption of the monarchy, triggered 
by accidental factors such as the personality of the king. Montesquieu, however, was con-
vinced that a ruler would always be tempted to expand his power beyond its legally imposed 
limits (XI, 4). In order to maintain the rule of the law in the government of a single ruler, 
structural boundaries were therefore necessary. Montesquieu claimed that, in continental 
monarchies such as France, the nobility was the most natural of such barriers: “In a way, the 
nobility is of the essence of monarchy, whose fundamental maxim is: no monarch, no nobil-
ity: no nobility, no monarch; rather one has a despot.” (II, 4). 
It should be emphasized that Montesquieu’s monarchical model did not imply a constitu-
tional balance of powers. Montesquieu did not believe that liberty depended on the nobility’s 
legal right to share sovereignty with the king. Instead, he described the nobility as an “inter-
mediary power”, which was “subordinate and dependant” on the king, who remained “the 
source of all political and civil power.” Intermediary powers acted as “mediate channels 
through which power flows.”. (II, IV) In this sense, the model of the limited monarchy dif-
fered fundamentally from another political model propagated by Montesquieu: the English 
constitution. English liberty, as Montesquieu made clear, depended on the functional division 
of powers on the central level. It was not dependent on the existence of intermediary bodies; 
indeed, in England those intermediary powers had almost completely disappeared. “To favour 
liberty,” Montesquieu emphasized, “the English have done away with all the intermediary 
powers which formed their monarchy. They have good reason to conserve that liberty; if they 
were to lose it, they would be one of the most enslaved peoples on earth.” (II, 4). 
With this description of the limited monarchy, Montesquieu propagated a model in which 
liberty was preserved through institutionalised insubordination rather than through fixed con-
stitutional checks and balances.6 Intermediary bodies limited central government not because 
they shared in sovereignty, but because they made the exercise of power more difficult. As he 
put it in the Esprit des lois: “Just as the sea, which seems to want to cover the whole earth, is 
checked by the grasses and the smallest bits of gravel on the shore, so monarchs, whose 
power seems boundless, are checked by the slightest obstacles and submit their natural pride 
                                                 
4 I have used the English translation of The Spirit of the Laws by A.Cohler,B.Miller and H.Stone (Cambridge, 
1989). Following conventional usage, I will not mention page numbers but the relevant book and chapter num-
bers in references to the Esprit des lois. 
5 See on this theme: Melvin Richter, “Montesquieu and the concept of civil society”, The European legacy, 3 
(1999), pp. 33-41.  
6 See on this subject: Elie Carcasonne, Montesquieu et le probleme de la constitution française au XVIIIe siècle, 
(Paris, 1927). , p. 82; Bernard Manin, “Montesquieu et la politique moderne”, Cahiers de philosophie politique, 
1985). , pp. 214-229.  
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to supplication and prayer.” (II, 4). In particular, the nobility’s sense of honour opposed barri-
ers against arbitrary power. While honour encouraged obedience to the prince, it prevented a 
blind obedience. Montesquieu illustrated this with the story of the Viscount Dorte. The Vis-
count had refused to partake in the massacre of the Huguenots on Saint Bartholemew’s Day, 
even though this order came directly from the king, because it would dishonour him to kill 
innocent people (IV, 2).7  
According to Montesquieu, in other words, social hierarchy, a nobility, was necessary for 
the preservation of liberty in a monarchy. Conversely, he identified “despotism” not just with 
arbitrary governments, but with a specific type of society, characterised by equality and at-
omisation.8 The despotic state, Montesquieu made clear, dissolved the social tissue. “In des-
potic states, each household is a separate empire.” (IV, 3). It was a government “where men 
believe themselves bound only by the chastisements that the former give the latter.” (V, 17). 
There were no real privileges or distinctions between the despot’s subjects. Vis-à-vis such an 
atomised society, despotism placed an all-powerful government. In a despotic state, all power 
was concentrated into the hands of the prince: “The prince, directing everything entirely to 
himself, calls the state to his capital, the capital to his court, and the court to his own person.” 
(VIII, 6). 
 
*** 
 
Montesquieu’s monarchical model, with its defence of the nobility as an instrument of liberty, 
had a considerable influence in the second half of the eighteenth century. References to Mon-
tesquieu’s concept of the intermediary powers abounded in the increasing opposition against 
absolutism under Louis XV and Louis XVI.9 When in 1789, that opposition finally exploded 
in the French Revolution, however, Montesquieu’s aristocratic liberalism came to be seen as 
outdated. From a very early stage, the revolutionaries turned towards the self-governing city 
states of classical antiquity rather than to the pre-absolutist monarchy as their political model. 
Concomitant with the rise of classical republicanism, hostility against Montesquieu’s aristo-
cratic liberalism increased during the Revolution. Investigations of revolutionary pamphlets 
show that Montesquieu’s popularity rapidly waned after 1789. The revolutionaries, far from 
seeing the aristocracy as an instrument of liberty, believed it to be an oppressive caste with 
but a negative social and political influence.10
                                                 
7 On the role of honour in Montesquieu’s political doctrine: M. Mosher, “Monarchy’s paradox: honor in the face 
of sovereign power” in Montesquieu’s science of politics, eds. Id. and Paul A. Rahe (Lanham, 2001), pp. 159-
231; Sharon Krause, Liberalism with honor (Cambridge, MA, 2002). 
8 On the innovativeness of this definition of despotism: R. Koebner, “Despot and despotism: vicissitudes of a 
political term”, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute 14 (1951), pp. 275-302; Roger Boesche, “Fear-
ing monarchs and merchants: Montesquieu's two theories of despotism”, Western Political Quarterly 43 (1990), 
pp. 741-761.  
9 Montesquieu’s influence is discussed in detail in Carcasonne, Montesquieu, part 3.  
10 Renato Galliani, “La fortune de Montesquieu en 1789: un sondage”, Archives des lettres modernes 197 (1981), 
pp. 31-61; Pierre Rétat, “1789: Montesquieu aristocrate”, Dix-huitième siècle. Revue annuelle 21 (1989), pp. 73-
82.  
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This did not mean, however, that the aristocratic liberalism of the Esprit des lois – its jus-
tification of intermediary powers and social hierarchy, its criticism of social equality as a 
threat to liberty – was lost for ever after 1789. The degeneration of the republican experiment 
into the Terror completely discredited the Jacobins’ ideal of a direct democracy. The post-
revolutionary period was therefore characterised by a search for alternative ways to safeguard 
liberty. This enterprise famously resulted in a turn towards negative liberty. Many post-
revolutionary thinkers came to understand freedom, in Benjamin Constant’s famous phrase, 
as “the peaceful enjoyment of private independence”, which was to be protected by represen-
tative institutions.11 But classical liberalism was by no means the only response to the failure 
of the Jacobin experiment. Montesquieu’s model of the limited monarchy, with its emphasis 
on the checking of central government by a nobility, was likewise seen as a viable alternative 
for the discredited model of participatory democracy. Indeed, although this has been largely 
ignored in the existing literature, aristocratic liberalism made a remarkable come-back in the 
political thought of post-revolutionary France.12
The first to seize on the potential of Montesquieu’s vision as an alternative for republi-
canism after the restoration of the monarchy in 1814 were the royalists. Defenders of king, 
Church and aristocracy, royalist politicians and publicists are usually depicted as mindless 
reactionaries.13 However, their political program, deeply influenced by Montesquieu, was 
more sophisticated than it is usually given credit for. The royalists believed that the preserva-
tion of liberty in France depended on the restoration of a territorial nobility. Without such an 
aristocratic class, the government would automatically revert to despotism and anarchy, as 
had happened during the French Revolution. For this reason, royalists attempted to buttress 
the economic power of the landed nobility by propagating a reform of the French property 
laws. Inheritance laws introduced during the Revolution, such as the law of partible inheri-
tance, encouraged the division of landed property. Royalist publicists believed that these laws 
were responsible for the levelled and atomized condition of French post-revolutionary society. 
They campaigned for the re-introduction of primogeniture in France, which would give the 
bulk of an inheritance to the eldest son.14  
In order to legitimate this program, royalist publicists frequently invoked the English ex-
ample. Traditionally seen as the home of liberty, the prestige of the English political system 
                                                 
11 Benjamin Constant, Collection complète des ouvrages, publiés sur le gouvernement représentatif et la Consti-
tution actuelle de la France, formant une espèce de cours de politique constitutionelle (Paris, 1818-1820, 8 vols.), 
VII, pp. 251-252.  
12 With the notable exception of G.A. Kelly, “Liberalism and aristocracy in the French Restoration”, Journal of 
the History of Ideas 26 (1965), pp. 509-530.  
13 Accounts of royalism as a “traditionalist” ideology: J.-J. Oechselin, Le mouvement ultra-royaliste sous la 
Restauration (Paris, 1960); Jean-Christian Petitfils, “Postérité de la Contre-révolution” in La Contre-révolution, 
eds. Jean Tulard and Benoit Yvert (Paris, 1990), p. 388; René Rémond, La droite en France de 1815 à nos jours. 
Continuité et diversité d’une tradition politique (Paris, 1954); Jean El Gammal, “1815-1900. L’apprentissage de 
la pluralité” in Histoire des droites en France. Vol. 1. Politique, ed. Jean-François Sirinelli (Paris, 1992), pp. 
491-518; Jacques Prévotat, “La culture politique traditionaliste” in Les cultures politiques en France, ed. Serge 
Berstein (Paris, 1999). 
14 Montesquieu’s influence on the royalist discourse is discussed in: Annelien De Dijn, “Aristocratic liberalism 
in post-revolutionary France”, The Historical Journal (48, 2005), pp. 661-681. 
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had only increased during the French Revolution. As the British had successfully resisted both 
internal upheaval and Napoleon’s armies, their constitution came to be seen as a model 
throughout the rest of Europe. Thus, the new French constitutional Charter introduced in 
1814, which introduced a bicameral legislature in France, was modelled on the English exam-
ple.15 According to the royalists, however, institutions such as the Chamber of Peers did not 
suffice to guarantee the particular mixture of liberty and stability characteristic of England. 
They claimed that English freedom should be attributed to the strength of its landed nobility 
even more than to any particular institution. The existence of such a powerful landed nobility 
was guaranteed in turn by inheritance laws that prevented the division of landed property, 
such as primogeniture and entailments. 
One of the most comprehensive statements of this view was provided by Charles Cottu, a 
lawyer at the Royal Court in Paris, in his De l’administration de la justice criminelle en An-
gleterre, et de l’esprit du gouvernement anglais (1820).16 Cottu was not an active politician. 
Although he was seen as a liberal at the beginning of the Restoration period, he moved con-
siderably to the right in the course of time. He supported the royalist government of Joseph de 
Villèle when it came to power in 1820, and by 1826, he was generally seen as representing, 
together with Louis de Bonald, the voice of the pointus, the most virulently anti-liberal ele-
ment in the royalist party.17 At the beginning of the Restoration period, Cottu had been sent 
on a government mission to study the English jury system, and his book was the result of that 
visit. However, Cottu did not limit himself to an analysis of the jury system. Rather, he 
sketched the working of the English political system in general, as well as the particular cus-
toms and habits on which it was based. Like Montesquieu, whose authority was invoked by 
the very title of his book, Cottu came to argue that liberty depended on the existence of an 
independent nobility, capable of checking the potentially despotic tendencies of central gov-
ernment.18
Cottu had no doubt that the mainstay of the English model was its powerful landed nobil-
ity. It was the aristocracy who really ruled England, not the king. He explained how the elec-
toral system allowed the nobility to buy votes and to appoint their chosen candidates to the 
rotten boroughs, which accounted for its predominance in both the House of Commons and 
the Lords. Nobles also controlled the local administration. This dominance of the aristocracy, 
Cottu explained, brought many benefits with it. It accounted for the superior administration of 
justice in England. It assured small government: in England everything went of its own ac-
cord, the government needed to interfere but little. However, the most important role of the 
                                                 
15 G. Bonno, La constitution brittanique devant l’opinion, de Montesquieu à Bonaparte (Paris, 1931). See also 
Annelien De Dijn, “Balancing the constition: bicameralism in post-revolutionary France, 1814-1831”, European 
Review of History, 12 (2005), pp. 249-268. 
16 I have used the second edition of 1822, reissued by Slatkin reprints: Charles Cottu, De l’administration de la 
justice criminelle en Angleterre, et de l’esprit du gouvernement anglais (Paris, 1822).  
17 On Charles Cottu: Prosper Duvergier de Hauranne, Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire en France, 1814-
1848 (Paris, 1857-1871, 10 vols.), X, pp. 399-400; Eugène Hatin, Histoire politique et littéraire de la presse en 
France, avec une introduction historique sur les origines du journal et la bibliographie générale des journeaux 
depuis leur origine (Geneva, 1967, 8 vols.), VIII, p. 517. 
18 Cottu, De l’esprit du gouvernement anglais, pp. ix-x. 
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English aristocracy, Cottu believed, was its function as an instrument of liberty. A locally 
entrenched elite, it resisted the central government when necessary. The existence of a class 
of landowners spread throughout the country created “a powerful dyke, both against the ex-
cesses of the democratic spirit, and against the encroachments of arbitrary power.”19 In short, 
the English example taught that the preservation of liberty depended on the existence of an 
aristocratic body. Although this might seem to some as a “paradox”, Cottu wrote, it was clear 
that “there can be no moderate government, and even less so any veritable liberty, without 
aristocracy.”20
The survival of such a landed nobility, Cottu argued, depended to a large extent on the 
English property laws. Indeed, in his very first chapter, Cottu explained that the English social 
structure was based on primogeniture, which implied that the largest portion of the estate went 
to the eldest son. This system was based on habit as much as on existing succession laws. 
Even when the law admitted free choice on the part of the testator, the eldest was usually pre-
ferred. According to Cottu, this system had considerable influence on the social stratification 
of England. It allowed individual families to amass and consolidate considerable fortunes over 
the generations. At the same time, it encouraged social stability, connecting noble families 
firmly to their estates and to their provinces. As a result, English society was characterised by 
the existence of a wealthy, local aristocracy, which, unlike the absentee French landlords of 
the Old Regime, played a crucial role in the political and social life of the provinces.21
In France, unfortunately, the inheritance laws promoted the division of landed property. 
The French therefore had no aristocracy comparable to the English. Although there were 
many rich people in France, the French lacked an entrenched nobility.22 For this reason, the 
French inheritance laws were “subversive of representative government”. These “disastrous 
laws” caused not just instability of government, but undermined the “esprit de famille” as 
well, so that everyone lived alone and isolated. Because they encouraged the eternal subdivi-
sion of landed property into ever smaller fragments, they were also detrimental to agriculture. 
Cottu concluded his book by pleading for the re-introduction of primogeniture in France, so 
as to re-establish an aristocracy “without which it will remain impossible to give the people 
all the rights which follow the constitutional system without exposing them to great danger.”23  
 
*** 
 
Throughout the Restoration period, the royalists’ political program was strenuously contested 
by their liberal opponents. Liberal thinkers and politicians, such as Benjamin Constant, Fran-
çois Guizot and Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard, pointed out that an aristocratic restoration had 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. 18. 
20 Ibid., p. 236. 
21 Ibid., pp. 1-19. 
22 Ibid., p. 239. 
23 Ibid., p. 247. 
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quite simply become impossible. Drawing on theories of social change that had been devel-
oped during the eighteenth century and the Revolution, they argued that France had become a 
levelled or “democratic” society, which was very different from the social ideal defended by 
royalists. Even if one agreed that the nobility might have played a useful political role in the 
past, they argued, it had nevertheless become an obsolete social element that could not be 
restored in post-revolutionary France. The royalists’ attempts to recreate a landowning nobil-
ity through primogeniture were impracticable and wrong-headed. The feudal nobility had no 
place in the new, democratic world.24
Despite this critique on the royalist discourse, however, many liberals found it difficult to 
escape Montesquieu’s influence. The demise of feudalism might be a positive and irreversible 
development, but the atomization of French society which had resulted from this process wor-
ried thinkers such as Germaine de Staël or Prosper de Barante no less than the royalists. Like 
their royalist opponents, they feared that a truly levelled society left no protection against 
governmental despotism. This analysis led a number of liberals to argue that the re-creation of 
an elite – albeit not the traditional, landowning nobility – was indispensable for the preserva-
tion of liberty in post-revolutionary France. Unsurprisingly, they detected the elements of 
such an elite in the victors of the French Revolution, the bourgeoisie. Some liberals therefore 
proposed to give a special place in the political system to the emerging industrialist class. 
More often, however, Restoration liberals turned towards the new professional elites which 
had come to the fore as local administrators during the French Revolution. They hoped to 
empower these local “notables” by decentralising the administrative system. 
This program was outlined most powerfully in the writings of Prosper de Barante, a for-
mer prefect who made name for himself as a political theorist and historian during the Resto-
ration period. Like the royalists, Barante was a great admirer of Montesquieu, who, as he 
wrote, had produced with the Esprit des lois “the monument that might honour him and his 
century the most.”25 Impressed with Montesquieu’s empirical spirit, Barante believed that no 
other book presented more useful advice for the government and administration of European 
nations, and in particular for France. He approved especially of Montesquieu’s analysis of 
despotism. The Esprit des lois explained clearly how a nation could be led to despotism, and 
warned its readers for the degrading effects of this form of government on a people. This as-
sured Montesquieu “for ever the love and admiration of men of good will.”26
It is therefore hardly surprising that Barante’s most important political treatise of the 
Restoration period, his widely read brochure Des communes et de l’aristocratie, contained a 
thoroughly Montesquieuian analysis of the French predicament. Barante had written this bro-
chure in response to the royalist government’s proposals for decentralisation in 1821. While 
the royalist government advocated a very limited measure, which would introduce elections 
                                                 
24 Larry Siedentop, “Two liberal traditions”, in: The idea of freedom. Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin, ed. 
Alan, Ryan (Oxford, 1979). A good example of the liberal critique on the royalist discourse: Charles Ganilh, De 
la contre-révolution en France ou de la restauration de l'ancienne noblesse et des anciennes superiorités socia-
les dans la France nouvelle (Paris, 1823). 
25 Prosper de Barante, Tableau de la littérature française aux dix-huitième siècle (Paris, 1832). p. 115.  
26 Ibid., p. 118. 
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only on the level of the municipal administration, not on the level of the departments,27 
Barante’s brochure defended a more radical form of decentralisation. He attempted to con-
vince the government that freely elected general councils, organised in each department, 
should have power of control over the prefects. However, Barante couched his arguments in a 
more general discussion of the political system, in which he attempted to provide an alterna-
tive to the royalists’ aristocratic liberalism. As such, it was generally praised by Barante’s 
liberal contemporaries. In an exhaustive review written upon the republication of this bro-
chure in 1829, Le Journal des débats acclaimed Des communes as “a courageous manifest 
against the men who […] give themselves over to […] dreams of factitious aristocracy and 
counter-revolution.”28  
Barante started out by arguing that proposals to recreate a territorial aristocracy in Fran-
ce, modelled on the English example, were doomed to fail. A return to feudalism was impos-
sible in an advanced society such as post-revolutionary France, he explained. The decline of 
the landed nobility had not been an accidental, remediable consequence of the Revolution, but 
dated from long before 1789. It had become inevitable when commerce and enlightenment 
expanded at the end of the Middle Ages. While these impersonal forces undermined the aris-
tocratic edifice, the growth of monarchical power had contributed to the demise of feudalism 
as well. The absolute kings had greatly encouraged the abasement of the aristocracy by turn-
ing it into a court nobility. This was an irreversible development, Barante stressed. The feudal 
nobility was no longer a possible instrument for the protection of post-revolutionary liberty. 
“We have to learn,” he wrote, “not to give to old age the remedies of infancy.” 29  
It was therefore hardly surprising that all attempts to recreate a nobility in post-
revolutionary France had failed. Both Napoleon and successive Restoration governments had 
endeavoured to re-establish a landed nobility. But neither the imperial nobility nor the Cham-
ber of Peers qualified as a true aristocracy, that existed independently from the will of the 
monarch. Barante was in particular dismissive of the attempts of the royalists, “the party that 
believes itself to be aristocratic,” to restore a territorial aristocracy in France.30 Their cam-
paign for primogeniture was doomed to fail, because it attempted to remedy a long-term proc-
ess of social change through legislation. The division of landed property did not date from the 
Revolution; it had started centuries ago. The nobility had ruined itself, encouraged by Louis 
XIV, and their property was fragmented as a result of their general poverty. In other words, 
the division of property had nothing to do with the legal system, it was the result of irreversi-
ble tendencies in French society. 
In short, “the social constitution” in France had never been “less aristocratic”, and never 
had individuals been “more isolated from one another.”31 However, Barante did not believe 
                                                 
27 Rudolf von Thadden, La centralisation contestée, trans. Hélène Cusa and Patrick Charbonneau (Paris, 1989), 
pp. 239-263.  
28 Quoted in Ibid., p. 305, note 158.  
29 Prosper de Barante, Des communes et de l'aristocratie (Paris, 1821)., pp. 23-59, quote p. 30  
30 Ibid., pp. 87-88.  
31 Ibid., p. 73.  
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that the levelling of French society was a process with wholly positive results. As we continue 
in Des communes et de l’aristocratie, it becomes clear that he also saw this development as a 
threat to the continued liberty and stability of the post-revolutionary state. If the individual 
citizens of a nation remained isolated, he echoed Montesquieu, they were without defence 
against the usurpation of their rights. An elite of enlightened and independent citizens was 
necessary both to resist abuses, and to protect the government against disorder.32 Without 
such a hierarchy, despotism and anarchy threatened, as was illustrated by the troubled situa-
tion in post-revolutionary France. For this reason, a new social elite was necessary – and 
Barante believed that decentralisation would allow such an elite to come into being in France.  
Barante made it quite explicit that he was primarily interested in decentralization as an 
instrument for social reorganization. His proposal for decentralisation did not just aim to 
achieve a better administrative system. Above all, it was meant to establish “a better constitu-
tion of society” by encouraging “the spirit of association between citizens,” as well as “the 
use of social superiorities to the general interest, which is the sole just and reasonable princi-
ple of aristocracy.” By turning local administrators into a class of “magistrates”, freely elected 
and therefore recognised by the population as their superiors, decentralization would allow the 
growth of a new elite.33 By having elected administrators, he hoped, “a progressive hierarchy 
will establish a non-interrupted chain between the monarch and his subjects.” By giving the 
more elevated ranks in society a role in the political system, they would provide “an honour-
able and faithful retinue” for the monarch, and they would defend, at the same time, national 
liberty against the usurpations of central power.34
Barante put much emphasis on the differences between his scheme and that of the royal-
ists. He underscored that the aristocracy he defended was very different from the territorial 
magnates idealised by the royalists: it was an elective, local elite. Free elections would allow 
the formation of a true aristocracy, based on the influence of its natural superiority, that was 
moreover independent from the government. It was not his goal to defend the interests of one 
specific class, as the royalists did with their advocacy of primogeniture. But despite these dif-
ferences, it is clear that Barante’s brochure was inspired by the same school of thought as the 
royalists’, based on Montesquieu’s Esprit des lois. Like the royalists, Barante believed that 
the levelling and atomisation of French society was problematic because this meant that there 
were no intermediary powers to check government power. And like the royalists, Barante be-
lieved that French society needed to be reorganised to make it more resistant against despot-
ism and anarchy, to counteract the malaise that had caused the Revolution.  
Barante’s conviction that a new nobility was necessary for the preservation of liberty and 
stability in France was shared by many of his fellow liberals. A similar argument was made, 
for instance, in Pierre-Paul Henrion de Pansey’s important treatise Du pouvoir municipal et de 
la police intérieure des communes (1825), which, apart from Barante’s Des communes et de 
l’aristocratie, was probably the most widely read and influential liberal treatise on decentrali-
                                                 
32 Ibid., pp. 132-157.  
33 Ibid., p. 1-22, quotes p. 22.  
34 Ibid., pp. 252-256, quotes p. 254-255.  
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sation.35 Like Barante, Henrion de Pansey was convinced that decentralization would form a 
natural elite within the “democratic” or bourgeois part of the nation. This “new aristocracy” 
would form a powerful barrier against anarchy and despotism, and thus guarantee the survival 
of the government instituted by the Charter.36 Aristocratic liberalism, in short, continued to 
survive in the Restoration period not just in the writings of the royalists. It also remained an 
important ingredient in the political discourse of many of their liberal opponents.  
 
*** 
 
A royalist through upbringing but a liberal by choice, Alexis de Tocqueville was acquainted 
with both these worlds while coming of age in the Restoration period. It is therefore hardly 
surprising that the main problems Tocqueville posed and the solutions he provided for them in 
his De la démocratie en Amérique (1835-1840) were inspired by ideas first developed by pub-
licists such as Cottu and Barante. Although he was a far more subtle and interesting thinker 
than his Restoration predecessors, many of his concerns, indeed even the vocabulary he used, 
reflected the particular intellectual milieu in which his political consciousness had matured. 
Like the Restoration liberals, he believed that the advent of a new and more democratic soci-
ety was irreversible, indeed “providential”.37 But he feared, as did his royalist friends and 
kinsmen, that the levelled, atomized society of post-revolutionary Europe had its downsides 
as well. The demise of the aristocracy had led to the disappearance of the ancient barriers 
against central power. Tocqueville was therefore convinced, like Prosper de Barante, that new 
checks and balances needed to be created, more suitable to the new, post-aristocratic age.  
In the preface to his Démocratie of 1835, Tocqueville explained that his book was writ-
ten in order to answer a very specific question: how to preserve liberty in a levelled, democ-
ratic society, where the old, aristocratic barriers against central power had disappeared? Mod-
ern history, Tocqueville wrote, had been characterised by “a great democratic revolution”, 
which had levelled social conditions and made individual citizens more equal to one an-
other.38 As a result, the specific form of liberty that had existed in France under the Old Re-
gime, when the power of great nobles formed a powerful check on royal absolutism, could no 
longer be restored. A return to aristocratic liberty had become impossible. “People who think 
of reviving the monarchy of Henry IV or Louis XIV seem to me quite blind,” he warned his 
                                                 
35 This brochure was first published in 1822; a revised and extended version was re-issued in 1825, and again in 
1833 and 1840. I have used the last edition.  
36 Pierre-Paul-Nicolas Henrion de Pansey, Du pouvoir municipal et de la police intérieure des communes (Paris, 
1840), p. 17.  
37 The influence of Restoration liberals on Tocqueville’s conception of social democracy is well documented. 
See in particular: Larry Siedentop, Tocqueville (Oxford, 1994); Aurelian Craiutu, “Tocqueville and the political 
thought of the French doctrinaires (Guizot, Royer-Collard, Rémusat)”, History of Political Thought, 20 (1999), 
pp. 456-493; Melvin Richter, “Tocqueville and Guizot on democracy: from a type of society to a political 
regime”, History of European Ideas, 30 (2004), pp. 61-82.  
38 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, transl. Arthur Goldhammer (New York, 2004), p. 3. 
 10 
readers in the Démocratie of 1835; repeating this in the volume of 1840: “I am convinced… 
that anyone who attempts to amass and hold authority within a single class will fail.”39  
A new model for liberty was necessary. Tocqueville therefore turned for inspiration to an 
example that seemed, at first sight, as far removed as possible from the aristocratic liberty 
glorified by his royalist predecessors. In the United States, the people ruled supreme, and the 
aristocracy was all but non-existent. Tocqueville clearly admired such popular self-rule, and 
he believed that it should be imitated in France. Nevertheless, he was at the same time con-
vinced that democratic rule, when it went unchecked, could pose an important threat to lib-
erty. He addressed this problem for the first time in the context of his discussion of the danger 
of popular tyranny in America. In a democratic system such as the United States, the majority 
had “an immense actual power together with a power of opinion that is almost as great”. As 
soon as the opinion of the majority on a specific issue had been formed, no obstacle was ca-
pable of stopping or even hampering its course.40 The omnipotence of the majority, Toc-
queville warned, could easily degenerate into an actual tyranny. For this reason, sovereign 
power, even when exercised by the people, should always be limited.41
Like Barante, Tocqueville pointed to the growth of a new type of aristocracy as a solu-
tion to this problem, although he located this new elite in the class of the lawyers rather than 
among local notables. His trip to the United States had convinced Tocqueville that lawyers 
held a very important place in American society. They formed a body distinct from the rest of 
the nation by their special knowledge, convinced of their own superiority. In this sense, law-
yers were the most “aristocratic” element in American society. Rather than the class of 
wealthy bankers, lawyers shared “some of the tastes and habits of aristocracy.”42 This aristo-
cratic class was actively hostile to many elements of the democratic system. Their penchant 
for order turned American lawyers into the natural opponents of the revolutionary spirit and 
unreflective passions of democracy, Tocqueville believed. Combined with its very real influ-
ence in American society, this class formed “the most powerful, if not the only, counterweight 
to democracy.”43
But Tocqueville did not put all of his hopes on the growth of such a new elite. In De la 
démocratie en Amérique, he developed an idea that was more or less absent from Barante’s 
brochure. Tocqueville argued that the levelling and atomization of democratic societies could 
be combated, not so much by the recreation of an aristocracy, but through the art of associa-
tion. From the American example, he learned how a system of decentralisation limited the 
power of government and administration by dividing it over several people, by multiplying 
functionaries. In New England, as in other American states, he explained, power was divided 
over at least nineteen officials. This rendered authority less irresistible and less dangerous, 
without undermining it. Tocqueville compared this system favourable with what he described 
                                                 
39 Ibid., p. 363, p. 822.  
40 Ibid., p. 284.  
41 Ibid., p. 288.  
42 Ibid., p. 304. 
43 Ibid., p. 309.  
 11
as the European way of safeguarding liberty. Europeans believed that liberty was safeguarded 
when power was weakened in its very principle, when the state sphere was as limited as pos-
sible. In America, on the contrary, the rights of society over its members were not contested, 
power was not attacked in its principle. Rather, it was divided in its exercise.44
Tocqueville returned to this idea in the second volume of the Démocratie, in which he 
explained how local institutions and associations could have a very similar function as the old 
nobility in restraining the potential despotic tendencies of the government. In aristocratic 
countries, the presence of “wealthy and influential” citizens instilled moderation in the gov-
ernment, because they could not be oppressed “easily or secretly”. These could be replaced in 
democratic countries through the art of association. Borrowing Montesquieu’s terminology, 
he described voluntary organizations as “secondary bodies temporarily constituted of ordinary 
citizens.” They allowed the citizens’ liberty to be more secure, without endangering their 
equality.45 They would preserve liberty without reconstructing an aristocracy, thus allowing 
“to bring forth liberty from the midst of the democratic society in which God has decreed we 
must live.”46 “I am firmly convinced that aristocracy cannot be re-established in the world. 
But ordinary citizens, by associating, can constitute very opulent, very influential, and very 
powerful entities – in a word, they can play the role of aristocrats.”47  
With Tocqueville, in short, we have come to an important turning point in the intellectual 
history of theories of civil society. In his De la démocratie en Amérique, civil society, under-
stood as the network of local and voluntary institutions and associations, was defended for the 
first time as the most suitable barrier against governmental despotism. While he had inherited 
the concept of an intermediary power from Montesquieu, through the mediation of publicists 
of the Restoration period, Tocqueville adapted it to the new realities of the post-revolutionary 
world. By looking for intermediary powers against central government in associations of or-
dinary citizens rather than in elites old or new, he made a decisive step in bending Montes-
quieu’s political model to the requirements of the new and more democratic age that had 
come into being with the French Revolution. Tocqueville had operated, as Jean-Claude Lam-
berti puts it, “a democratic transposition” of Montesquieu’s aristocratic liberalism.48
 
*** 
 
But had he really? Tocqueville’s De la démocratie en Amérique, for all of its insistence on the 
irreversible character of the rise of democracy, evinced an unmistakable nostalgia for the lost 
                                                 
44 Ibid., p. 78-82.  
45 Ibid., p. 823. 
46 Ibid., p. 822.  
47 Ibid., II, pp. 842-843. 
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aristocratic world of the Old Regime.49 In particular, his discussion of the effects of the rise of 
democratic modernity in the second volume of the Démocratie is quite surprisingly critical for 
a thinker who is usually perceived as the main prophet of democracy. Describing the influ-
ence of the levelled condition of society on the sentiments and moeurs prevalent in democ-
ratic societies, Tocqueville made a sustained and often unflattering comparison with the atti-
tudes which he deemed typical of aristocratic societies.50 More specifically, he identified three 
“passions”, which he believed to be typical of a democratic people: the love of equality, the 
taste for well-being, and individualism. All of these passions posed, in his view, a threat to the 
associational life which was required for the preservation of freedom. 
Social equality, Tocqueville explained, engendered a passion for material comforts, for 
well-being. Democratic man was typically an acquisitive man. At first sight, the love of well-
being was more compatible with liberty than the other passions engendered by equality. Ac-
cording to Tocqueville, history showed that there was a close link between liberty and the 
industriousness of a people. A democratic people needed liberty to fulfil its passion for mate-
rial goods. Nevertheless, this passion could easily lead to despotism. If citizens were not en-
lightened enough to see the connection between liberty and industry, they might easily be 
persuaded to give up their political rights in exchange for protection against the threat of anar-
chy; they might become more interested in order than in liberty.51 The passionate devotion of 
democratic nations to the principle of equality likewise threatened liberty. Such a people was 
prepared to sacrifice its political rights if this would prevent a return to an aristocracy, as it 
had happened, for instance, at the end of the French Revolution.52
But the greatest threat to associational life, in Tocqueville’s view, came from the “indi-
vidualism” typical of levelled societies, a sentiment which predisposed each citizen to isolate 
himself from the rest of the population, and to withdraw into his private sphere. Individualism 
was an inevitable consequence of a democratic social condition. In aristocratic societies, on 
the contrary, which lacked the geographical and social mobility of democratic societies, soli-
darity across time and space was more pronounced. Aristocratic institutions established closer 
links between citizens, because individuals were always connected to those on a higher and 
lower level. “Aristocracy linked all citizens together in a long chain from peasant to king. 
Democracy breaks the chain and severs the links.”53  
Thus, the levelling of society throughout the ages had created an atomised, individualistic 
society, where citizens were isolated from one another. Tocqueville believed that the equal-
ised condition of modern societies encouraged the unlimited growth of government power, a 
process which he described as “centralization”. This was explained in particular in part 4 of 
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the second volume of the Démocratie, where Tocqueville discussed the influence of the sen-
timents and ideas engendered by democracy on the political society. He described the pro-
gress of centralisation as the result of psychological attitudes typical of democratic societies.  
An aristocratic people, he argued, naturally tended towards the creation of “secondary 
powers, placed between sovereign and subjects,” because important individuals and families 
were readily available in such a society. A democratic nation, however, had a penchant for a 
strong central power, because it had a high opinion of the rights of society and a low opinion 
of the rights of individuals. As conditions became more levelled, individuals became more 
and more insignificant, and society seemed increasingly encompassing, until “nothing can be 
seen any more but the vast and magnificent image of the people itself.”54 The sentiments of a 
democratic people contributed to this tendency as well. The passion for individualism and the 
materialism of democratic peoples drew them away from public life, made them more inter-
ested in order. Particular causes, Tocqueville emphasized, related to the revolutionary inheri-
tance, made this tendency even more outspoken on the European Continent than in the United 
States.55
As a result, sovereign power in most European states was continually growing. Inde-
pendent bodies that had once cooperated with central power in government and administration 
had been abolished. The “secondary powers” had been destroyed, and all rights previously 
exercised by bodies such as the nobility had been concentrated in the hands of the sovereign. 
But at the same time central government had penetrated into areas that up till then had been 
reserved for individual independence. While aristocratic governments limited themselves to 
areas that were of national interest, democratic governments believed themselves responsible 
for the actions of their individual subjects. Moreover, central power showed itself more active 
and independent than ever before, because the development of industry made centralisation 
more and more necessary. In short, “all the diverse rights that have been wrested in recent 
years from classes, corporations, and individuals were not used to establish new secondary 
powers on a more democratic basis but were concentrated instead in the hands of the sover-
eign.”56
Tocqueville underscored that the despotism to be feared in democratic societies differed 
from the military despotism of the Roman Emperors, established by force and exercised with 
violence. He described it as a more peaceful kind of dictatorship, stifling rather than violent. 
Not a bloody tyranny, but an oppressive tutelage threatened to become the future government 
of European nations, degrading its subjects rather than tormenting them.57 But at the same 
time, the new despotism would be more complete and interfering than even the most absolut-
ist regime of the past. The different nations of the Roman Empire had all been able to retain 
their customs and moeurs, as Tocqueville reminded his readers; the provinces were dotted 
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with rich and powerful municipalities. Although the emperors had exercised power alone, and 
decided over everything in principle, many details of social life and the individual existence 
had escaped their control. The new despotism, however, would leave no room for this type of 
individual resistance and aberration, but would reduce the nation to “a flock of timid and in-
dustrious animals, with the government as its shepherd.”58
In short, Tocqueville had a highly ambiguous attitude towards the rise of modernity. He 
was firmly convinced that the increasing equality of modern societies was an irreversible and 
providential development. For this reason, he looked for an alternative for the traditional aris-
tocratic barriers against central government in the local and voluntary institutions and associa-
tions so typical of the American model. But at the same time, Tocqueville inherited from his 
pro-aristocratic predecessors a highly critical attitude towards social equality. Reading his 
book, especially the second volume of the Démocratie, we clearly get the sense that some-
thing irretrievable had been lost with the demise of the aristocracy. This critique of democ-
ratic modernity can be explained by the fact that the roots of Tocqueville’s thought can be 
traced back to eighteenth-century aristocratic liberalism.  
 
*** 
 
Tocqueville’s feeling of loss, his critical attitude towards the rise of democracy was echoed by 
many liberals of the 1850s and 1860s. The establishment of the Second Empire in 1850-1852 
in the wake of the February Revolution of 1848, convinced many opponents of the new re-
gime of the correctness of Tocqueville’s analysis. Louis Napoleon’s rise to power illustrated, 
in the eyes of many liberals, more clearly than ever before the necessity of extra-
parliamentary barriers against central power. Like Tocqueville, liberals such as Charles de 
Montalembert, Odilon Barrot and Victor de Broglie became firmly committed to decentraliza-
tion as the only realistic way of curbing central power in modern, egalitarian societies. But 
again like Tocqueville, their arguments in favour of civil society were suffused with a nostal-
gic longing for the aristocratic past and a highly critical attitude towards democratic moder-
nity.  
Such pessimism can be found for instance, in the writings of Charles de Montalembert, 
who was the scion of an old noble family of staunch royalists. Unlike most of his peers, 
Montalembert had rallied to the new regime in 1830 as a liberal Catholic. He gained a consid-
erable reputation during the July Monarchy as a defender of religious liberty, cooperating 
with Félicité de Lammenais on L’Avenir; and he became known to the general public with a 
campaign for educational freedom in the 1840s. Under the Second Republic, Montalembert 
initially supported Louis Napoleon’s presidential regime. But after the coup d’état of 1851, he 
became an enemy of the Empire and a staunch defender of liberty in all of its forms. From a 
liberal Catholic, he became, as one historian has expressed it, a Catholic liberal.59
                                                 
58 Tocqueville, Democracy, p. 819.  
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Like Alexis de Tocqueville, whose De la démocratie Montalembert had read with great 
admiration, he believed that the levelled condition of French society made the establishment 
of a stable, liberal regime problematic.60 The overthrow of parliamentary government in 1848, 
Montalembert argued, had not been accidental, but it was related to a more fundamental defi-
ciency in French society. More specifically, he believed that the establishment of a liberal 
regime was hindered by the absence of a traditional social elite in France and on the European 
Continent in general. “In essence”, he wrote in his brochure Des intérêts catholiques au XIXe 
siècle, which was published in 1852, “democracy is incompatible with liberty, because it is 
based on envy posturing as equality; while liberty, by its very nature, protests incessantly 
against the tyrannical and brutal level of equality.”61  
Montalembert turned to the example of the English, decentralized state as a solution to 
this problem, which resulted in 1856 in the publication of his major political treatise, De 
l’avenir politique de l’Angleterre. The publication of this book was triggered by a debate 
about the viability of the English model, which had developed as a result of English failure in 
the Crimean War. In De la décadence de l’Angleterre (1850), Alexandre Ledru-Rollin clai-
med that “the great system of the British aristocracy” was on the brink of collapse.62 Monta-
lembert’s response to this claim was indignant. De l’avenir politique, which defended the con-
tinued viability of the English political model, went through five successive editions in Fran-
ce, while in England it even raised a debate in parliament in April 1856.63  
More remarkable than Montalembert’s rather conventional praise of the English model, 
is the outright attack he formulated at the beginning of his book on the rise of social equality. 
Like Tocqueville, he believed that the constant progress and final triumph of “democracy”, 
implying both social and political equality, was an inevitable development in modern socie-
ties. “Democracy governs wherever it does not yet reign,” he wrote.64 Again like Tocqueville, 
Montalembert believed that this evolution was, to a certain extent, a positive one. He ap-
plauded the fact that barriers, which had prevented the masses to enjoy specific commodities 
and rights in the past, had been or were being reversed. Equality before the law and equal 
taxation were acclaimed by Montalembert as conquests of justice. Likewise, he believed it to 
be a positive evolution that public officials were now chosen for their merit rather than for 
their background, as this implied a recognition of legitimate superiority.  
                                                 
60 Montalembert admired in particular the second volume of the Démocratie, “cette admirable prophétie, à 
laquelle il conviendrait de rendre son véritable titre: De la démocratie en France et en Europe.” Quoted from: 
Charles de Montalembert, Des intérêts catholiques au XIXe siècle (Paris, 1852), p. 154, note 1.  
61 Ibid., quote p. 97. This idea was not new to Montalembert. In 1839, one year before the publication of the 
second volume of Tocqueville’s De la démocratie, Montalembert had already criticised “democracy” as a des-
potic force in his correspondence with his friend and fellow liberal-catholic Père Lacordaire. However, 
Montalembert did not publicly want to defend an “aristocratic system” during the July Monarchy, as he also 
indicated to his correspondent, because he had more pressing priorities as a catholic. Lecanuet, Montalembert, 
III, pp. 184-190.  
62 Alexandre Ledru-Rollin, De la décadence de l’Angleterre (Brussels, 1850), p. 171. 
63 As Montalembert indicated in the preface to the third edition of his De l’avenir politique de l’Angleterre.  
64 Charles de Montalembert, De l’avenir politique de l’Angleterre (Paris, 1856), p. 35. 
 16 
But the progress of democracy also entailed considerable dangers. Echoing Tocqueville’s 
criticism of democracy and the harmful psychological attitudes which it brought with it, 
Montalembert pointed out that a democratic condition engendered hatred, jealousy, and envy 
against all forms of superiority. For this reason, democracy posed a threat to both liberty and 
stability: “[Democracy] is the enemy of everything which lasts, of everything which resists, of 
everything which grows,” he wrote. “It negates all gradual progress of liberty; it insults all its 
natural allies; an above all it pursues with an implacable ingratitude the princes which have 
brought it into being or who have served it. It creates a perpetual turbulence in nations; it 
brings them to look for shelter in the first haven they encounter, and to become the servant or 
hostage of whomever will save them from the wreckage.” Montalembert had little doubts 
about the eventual outcome of this process: “Thus it cannot but help to clear the route for the 
unity of despotism.”65
In particular, Montalembert was concerned about the atomisation of society engendered 
by the progress of democracy. In democratic societies, mechanical, artificial connections sub-
stituted moral, natural, traditional bonds, which could act as a guarantee against central 
power. Independence was abhorred. In a democratic society, the valour and dignity of man 
was absorbed by the state, and capacity, courage and uprightness were ostracised. The gov-
ernment by men superior through their capacity and virtue was rejected; instead rule by num-
bers was imposed. By isolating individual citizens in this manner from one another, the proc-
ess of democratisation had encouraged the establishment of despotism.66
Similar criticisms were echoed by other liberal decentralizers as well. Victor de Broglie, 
a former Prime Minister and one of the most influential political figures of the July Monar-
chy, pleaded in his Vues sur le gouvernement de la France (1870) for decentralization as a 
necessary prerequisite for re-establishing liberty and stability in France.67 This was in his 
view to only way to counteract the atomization of French society, which he described as “pul-
verised into individuals – individuals without connections, without cohesion, without personal 
resistance, individuals brushed away by the wind, one by one, like so many sprigs of straw.”68 
De la centralisation et de ses effets (1861), written by Odilon Barrot, one of the leaders of the 
radical left under the July Monarchy, evinced a similar critical attitude towards the recent 
past. The Old Regime had been characterised by hierarchy, traditional influences, and rela-
tionships of vassalage and patronage. Although the absolute monarchy had worked hard to 
“dissolve all resisting forces in society,”69 some remnants of the institutions of the Middle 
Ages had survived throughout the Old Regime. But the National Assembly had made tabula 
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rasa of these last obstacles: “independence of the clergy, tradition of nobility, municipal cor-
porations, syndicates, provincial orders, parlements, hereditary offices, all disappeared in one 
day, not to be reformed in the sense of liberty, but to enrich and increase central power with 
their spoils.” Napoleon completed this work by destroying everything left of individual inde-
pendence. As a result, Barrot complained, French society had become “individualised”; the 
state alone was powerful.70
 
*** 
 
In short, the language in which opposition against a strong state was formulated in nineteenth-
century France clearly showed its roots in aristocratic liberalism. Tocqueville and his liberal 
followers of the Second Empire believed that the rise of modern democratic states was an 
irreversible and providential development. They defended decentralization and civic associa-
tions as the best protection against the despotic tendencies of central government in the atom-
ized societies which had resulted from this process, rather than a resurrection of elites old or 
new. Nevertheless, the discourse of these liberal decentralizers remained imbued with a nos-
talgia for the aristocratic past and a highly critical attitude towards democratic modernity. In 
this sense, the French conception of civil society had an anti-modernist flavour. 
This conclusion is not without its relevance for contemporary political debate. For, it is 
possible to argue that the historical pessimism of the French tradition has continued to rever-
berate in the writings of Tocqueville’s twentieth-century followers. The writings of Robert 
Putnam, perhaps the most famous of today’s neo-Tocquevilleians, are a case in point. Chart-
ing the decline of associational life in his Bowling alone, arguably one of the most influential 
books of the past decade, the golden age invoked by Putnam is the America of the 1950s 
rather than an aristocratic past. Nevertheless, Putnam decries, like Tocqueville and his follow-
ers of the Second Empire, a growing individualism as one of the most important and danger-
ous characteristics of contemporary society.71 Even today, in other words, proponents of a 
more political conception of civil society continue to think of associational life as being under 
threat in modern societies.  
 
 
                                                 
70 Ibid., p. 49. 
71 Robert Putnam, Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community (New York, 2000).  
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